Recent applications that arise in machine learning have surged significant interest in solving minmax saddle point games. This problem has been extensively studied in the convex-concave regime for which a global equilibrium solution can be computed efficiently. In this paper, we study the problem in the non-convex regime and show that an ε-first order stationary point of the game can be computed when one of the players objective can be optimized to global optimality efficiently. In particular, we first consider the case where the objective of one of the players satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz (PL) condition. For such a game, we show that a simple multi-step gradient descent-ascent algorithm finds an ε-first order stationary point of the problem in O(ε −2 ) iterations. Then we show that our framework can also be applied to the case where the objective of the "max-player" is concave (or equivalently when the "min-player" has a convex objective).
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a wide range of machine learning and robust optimization applications being formulated as a min-max saddle point game; see [34, 12, 11, 33, 16, 35] and the references therein. Although this formulation was previously studied for two-player zero sum-games, the new applications have brought significant attention to this class of problems. Examples of problems that are formulated under this framework include generative adversarial networks (GANs) [34] , reinforcement learning [12] , adversarial learning [35] , learning exponential families [11] , generative adversarial imitation learning [5, 20] , and many others. These applications require solving an optimization problem of the form min θ∈Θ max α∈A f (θ, α).
(
One can view this optimization problem as a zero-sum game between two players where the goal of the first player is to minimize the objective function f (·, ·) over the set of strategies Θ, while the other player's objective is to maximize the objective function over the set of strategies A. A key observation is that simple first-order methods such as constant step-size gradient descent-ascent algorithm can fail even for simple bilinear zero-sum games [25] . This failure of simple gradient descent-ascent for bilinear games was overcome by optimistic mirror descent and primal-dual methods proposed by [9, 13] .
A more general setting of the problem, we denote as convex-concave min-max saddle point games, is when the objective f is convex in θ and concave in α. This setting has been extensively studied in the literature and based on the corresponding monotone variational inequality, different algorithms have been developed for finding a Nash equilibrium of such a convex-concave game [28, 26, 21, 24] . In another thread, several methods were designed to directly solve the convex-concave saddle point game. Among these methods is an extension of Frank-Wolfe method proposed by [17] , and a randomized primal-dual method proposed by [19] .
While the convex-concave setting has been studied extensively in the literature, recent machine learning applications urge the necessity of moving beyond this classical setting. An example of these applications is GANs which constitutes of two neural networks (generator and discriminator) competing in a zero-sum game framework [18] . Even in the absence of adversarial player, such non-convex problems are hard to solve even up to local optimality or second-order-stationarity [31, 27] . Consequently, finding (or even checking) local Nash equilibrium of general min-max games is hard. Therefore, inspired by the successes of first order algorithms in non-convex optimization, researchers have focused on finding first order Nash equilibrium of such games -see [32] and Definition 1 in this paper. The first order Nash equilibrium can be viewed as a direct extension of the concept of first order stationarity in optimization to the above min-max game setting. While ε-first order stationarity in the context of optimization can be found efficiently in O(ε −2 ) iterations with gradient descent algorithm [29] , the question of whether it is possible to design an efficient algorithm that can find an ε-first order Nash equilibrium for general non-convex saddle point games remains unresolved.
In the case where the underlying game has certain structures there have been some limited advances in recent years. A recent result appeared in [34] where the authors proposed a stochastic gradient descent algorithm for the case when the objective function is non-convex in θ and strongly concave in α. They show convergence of the algorithm to an ε-first-order stationary point with O(ε −4 ) gradient evaluations. More recently, [33] considered the problem when the objective f is non-convex in θ and concave in α.
They developed a stochastic sub-gradient descent method and show convergence to ε-first-order stationary point with worst-case complexity O(ε −6 ).
In an effort to crack the more general non-convex non-concave setting, [23] developed a framework that successively solves strong monotone variational inequalities. They show convergence to ε-first order stationarity/Nash equilibrium under the assumption that there exists a solution to the Minty variational inequality. Although among the first algorithms to have theoretical convergence guarantees in the nonconvex non-concave setting, the conditions required are strong and difficult to check. To the best of our knowledge there is no practical problem for which the Minty variational inequality condition has been proven.
Exploring the non-convex non-concave setting, in this paper, we propose a simple multi-step gradient descent ascent algorithm that finds an ε-first order Nash equilibrium when the objective of one of the players satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz (PL) condition. We show that the worst-case complexity of our algorithm is O(ε −2 ). It is worth noting that this rate is optimal in terms of depdendency on ε up to logarithmic factors as discussed in Section 3. Compared to Minty variational inequality condition used in [23] , the PL condition is very well studied in the literature and has been theoretically verified for simple cases of many practical problems. For example, it is been proven to be true in objectives for over-parametrized deep networks [14] , learning LQR models [15] , phase retrieval [36] , and many other simple problems discussed in [22] . In the context of min-max games, it has also been proven useful in generative adversarial imitation learning with LQR dynamics [5] where our result can be applied as we discuss later. These results motivate the study of the problem when the PL condition is satisfied to develop efficient algorithms with theoretical performance guarantees.
In addition to the PL scenario, in this paper we propose an alternative multi-step framework that finds an ε-first order Nash equilibrium/stationary with O(ε −3.5 ) gradient evaluations when the objective function is concave in parameter α (or equivalently, when it is convex in θ). At each iteration, our algorithm runs multiple steps of Nesterov accelerated projected gradient ascent [30] to estimate the solution of a regularized version of the maximization problem. This solution is then used to estimate the gradient of the value function of the maximization problem, which directly provides a descent direction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the concepts of first order Nash equilibrium and ε-first order Nash equilibrium. In Section 3, we describe our multi-step gradient descent ascent algorithm designed for non-convex non-concave games with the objective of one player satisfying the PL condition. Finally, in Section 4 we describe our framework for solving games in which the objective function f (θ, α) is concave in α (or equivalently when it is convex in θ).
2 Two-player Min-Max Games and First-Order Nash Equilibrium
Consider the zero sum min-max game
where Θ and A are both convex sets, and f (θ, α) is a continuously differentiable function. As discussed earlier, finding a (local) Nash equilibrium of this problem (or even checking this property for a given point) is hard for a general non-convex/concave objective f (·). Thus, in this paper we aim at a more modest task of finding a first order Nash equilibrium (FNE) which we define in the sequel.
For the constrained problem (2), we say (θ * , α * ) ∈ Θ × A is a FNE of the game if
or equivalently if
Notice that these conditions are the first order necessary optimality conditions for the objective of each player [32, 4] . Motivated by (3), we can formally define the FNE for constrained game (2) as follows.
Definition 1 (FNE).
A point (θ * , α * ) is said to be a first-order Nash equilibrium (FNE) of the game (2), if
where
and
are first order measures of the stationarity of the min and the max sub-problems respectively 1 .
In the abscense of constraints, the above definition simplifies to the conditions ∇ θ f (θ * , α * ) = 0 and ∇ α f (θ * , α * ) = 0, which are the well-known unconstrained first order optimality conditions. Moreover, the FNE condition is a necessary condition for (local) Nash equilibrium. Noticing the fact that the measures X (·, ·) and Y(·, ·) are non-negative and continuous, we can define an ε-approximate FNE of the min-max game (2) as follows.
Definition 2 (Approximate FNE).
A point (θ * , α * ) is said to be an ε-first-order Nash equilibrium (ε-FNE) of the game (2) if
Notice that in the absence of constraints, ε-FNE in Definition 2 reduces to
Our goal in this paper is to find an ε-FNE of the game (2) using iterative methods. To proceed, in the rest of this paper we make the following standard assumptions about the smoothness of the objective function f .
Assumption 3. The function f is continuously differentiable in both θ and α and there exists constants L 11 , L 22 and L 12 such that for every α, α 1 , α 2 ∈ A, and θ, θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ Θ, we have
3 Non-Convex PL-Game
In this section, we consider the problem of developing an "efficient" algorithm for finding an ε-FNE of (2). First notice that any non-convex minimization problem min θ q(θ) could be trivially written as a game min θ max α f (θ, α), where f (θ, α) = q(θ), ∀α. Thus, finding an ε-first order Nash equilibrium of the game is equivalent to finding an ε-stationary point of the non-convex function q(θ). It is well-known that for general non-convex smooth problems, finding an ε-stationary solution requires at least Ω(ε −2 ) gradient evaluations and this lower bound can be achieved by simple gradient descent method [6, 29] . Clearly, this lower bound is also valid for finding ε-first order Nash equilibrium of games using first order information. In this section, we will show that this lower bound can also be achieved (up to logarithmic factors) for a class of non-convex non-concave min-max game problems for which the objective of one of the players satisfies the PL-condition. To proceed, let us first formally define the Polyak-Lojasiewicz (PL) condition:
The PL-condition has been established and utilized for analyzing many practical modern problems [22, 15, 14, 36, 5] . Moreover, it is well-known that a function can be non-convex and still satisfy the PL condition [22] . Based on the definition above, we define a class of min-max PL-games.
Definition 5 (PL-Game). We say that the min-max game (2) is a PL-Game if the max player is unconstrained, i.e., A = R n , and there exists a constant µ > 0 such that the function
In what follows we provide a simple example of a practical PL-game.
Example 6 (Generative adversarial imitation learning (GAIL) of linear quadratic regulators).
Imitation learning is a paradigm where we are aiming to learn from an expert's demonstration of performing a task [5] . It is known that this learning process can be formulated as a min-max game [20] . In such a game the minimization is performed over all the policies and the goal is to minimize the discrepancy between the accumulated reward for expert's policy and the proposed policy. On the other hand, the maximization is done over the parameters of the reward function and we aim at maximizing this discrepancy over the parameters of the reward function. This approach is also referred to as generative adversarial imitation learning (GAIL) [20] . The problem of generative adversarial imitation learning for linear quadratic regulators [5] refers to solving this problem for the specific case where the underlying dynamic and the reward function come from a linear quadratic regulator [15] . To be more specific, this problem can be formulated [5] as min K max θ∈Θ m(K, θ), where K represents the choice of the policy and θ represents the parameters of the dynamic and the reward function. In this special formulation of the problem presented in [5] , m is strongly concave in θ and PL in K (see [5] for more details). Note that since m is strongly concave in θ and P L in K, any FNE of the game would also be a Nash equilibrium point. Also note that the notion of FNE does not depend on the ordering of the min and max. Thus, to be consistent with our notion of PL-games, we can formulate the problem as
Thus, generative adversarial imitation learning of linear quadratic regulators is an example of finding a FNE for a min-max PL-game.
In what follows, we present a simple iterative method for computing an ε-FNE of PL games.
Multi-step gradient descent ascent for PL-games
To present the ideas of our multi-step algorithm, let us re-write (2) as
For the class of PL-games, we show that an "approximate" gradient of the function g(·) in (9) can be computed for any given θ. Using this approximate gradient direction, we use a naive gradient descent method to find an approximate stationary point of (8) in Algorithm 1. More precisely, the inner loop in Algorithm 1 solves the maximization problem (9) for a given fixed value θ = θ t . The computed solution of this optimization problem is then used to approximate the gradient of the function g(θ). More formally, we will later use a "Danskin-type" result [3] to show that ∇ θ f (θ t , α t+1 ) ≈ ∇g(θ t ).
Convergence analysis of Algorithm 1 for PL games
To analyze algorithm 1, let us first start by showing that the function g(θ) is Lipschitz smooth.
Lemma 7. Under Assumption 3 and PL-game assumption, the function g is L-Lipschitz smooth with
2µ .
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.1.
To proceed, let us make the following assumption.
Assumption 8. The constraint set Θ is convex and compact. Moreover, there exists a ball with radius R, denoted by B R , such that Θ ⊆ B R .
Using Lemma 7 and Assumption 8, we can define
The next result shows that the inner loop in Algorithm 1 computes an approximate gradient of g(·). In other words, ∇ θ f (θ t , α t+1 ) ≈ ∇g(θ t ).
µ ≥ 1 and ρ = 1 − 1 κ < 1 and assume g(θ t ) − f (θ t , α 0 (θ t )) < ∆, then for any prescribed ε ∈ (0, 1) if we choose K large enough such that
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.2.
The above lemma implies that Algorithm 1 behaves similar to the simple vanilla gradient descent method applied to problem (8) . Thus, its convergence to a stationary point can be established similar to the gradient descent algorithm. More precisely, we can show the following theorem.
,R max{R, 1}, and
where g * min θ g(θ) is the optimal value of g. Moreover, assume that g(
then there exists an iteration t ∈ {0, · · · , T } such that (θ t , α t+1 ) is an ε-FNE of (2).
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A.3.
It is worth noticing that the initial condition ∆ g = g(θ 0 ) − g * < ∞ is satisfied due to the compactness assumption of the set Θ. Moreover, the assumption g(θ t )−f (θ t , α 0 (θ t )) ≤ ∆, ∀t could be justified because the difference between consecutive optimal solutions computed by the inner loop of the algorithm, are upper bounded by the difference between corresponding θ's that belong to a compact set; see Lemma 3 in the Appendix A.
Remark 11. In the unconstrained case, i.e. when Θ is the entire euclidean space, we can remove the dependencies on the constant R. Thus, we can improve the bounds we have on T and K in Theorem 10 to obtain
Corollary 12. Under Assumption 3 and Assumption 8, Algorithm 1 finds an ε-FNE of the game (2) with O(ε −2 ) gradient evaluations of the objective with respect to θ and O(ε −2 log(ε −1 )) gradient evaluations with respect to α. If the two gradient oracles have the same complexity, the overall complexity of the method would be O(ε −2 log(ε −1 )). As discussed at the beginning of this section, this rate is optimal up to logarithmic factors. In the next section we consider the non-convex concave min-max saddle game, and propose an algorithm that can find an approximate first order stationary point in at most O(ε −3.5 ) gradient evaluations. It is well-known that convexity/concavity does not imply the PL condition and PL condition does not imply convexity/concavity [22] . Therefore, the problems we consider in the next section are neither restriction nor extension of our results on PL games.
Non-Convex Concave Games
In this section, we study the "non-convex concave" min-max games where the objective of the max player is concave while the objective of the min player is non-convex. More precisely, we consider the min-max game (2) and make the following assumption.
Assumption 14. The objective function f (θ, α) is concave in α for any fixed value of θ. Moreover, we assume that the set A is convex and compact, and there exists a ball with radius R that contains the feasible set A.
To find an ε-FNE of the game (2), we follow the same idea as in the previous section. However, unlike the PL case, one can show that the function g(·) is not necessarily differentiable. Therefore, in order to find an ε-FNE of (2), we first approximate the function g(·) by a differentiable function which can be arbitrarily close to g. Then we apply gradient descent method to our approximation. To formally describe our algorithm, let us start by defining
whereᾱ ∈ A is some given fixed point and λ > 0 is a regularization parameter that we will specify later. Since f (θ, α) is concave in α, we obtain
for any α 1 , α 2 ∈ A. Hence, f λ (θ, ·) is λ-strongly concave.
Before proceeding to our algorithm and its convergence analysis, we first show some properties of the functions f λ (·, ·) and g λ (·).
Lemma 15. Under Assumption 3 and Assumption 14, the function g λ is L-Lipschitz smooth with L =
λ .
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix B.1.
Based on this result and the compactness assumption, we can define
where α * (θ) arg max α∈A f λ (θ, α). To solve the problem with respect to the parameter α, we are going to use accelerated projected gradient descent methods. The next lemma is known for accelerated projected gradient descent when applied to strongly convex functions.
Lemma 16. Assume h(x)
is λ-strongly convex and L-smooth. Then, applying accelerated projected gradient descent algorithm [2] with step-size 1/L and restart parameter N 8L/λ − 1 for K iterations, we get x K such that
where x * arg min x∈F h(x).
Proof. The proof is simply based on applying Nesterov's restart idea [30] to the accelerated projected gradient descent algorithm in [2] . Details can be found in Appendix B.2.
We are now ready to describe our proposed algorithm.
Algorithm Description
Similar to the previous section, our algorithm in this section consists of two loops. The goal of the inner loop is to find an approximate gradient for the function g λ and use it in the outerloop to minimize g(·). Let θ t , α K (θ t ) be the point obtained at the end of iterate t of the outer loop in Algorithm 4. Given θ t , α K (θ t ) , we define descent amount
and the first order descent direction
In the unconstrained case, the descent direction s t = −∇ θ f λ (θ t , α K (θ t )) which leads to an approximate gradient descent method. Our proposed framework incorporates two first-order algorithms. The first algorithm is run for K iterations and updates α k (θ t ) and the second algorithm is then run for one iteration to update θ t using the final iterate α K (θ t ). This procedure is then repeated until we find an ε-FNE point.
Algorithm 2 Multi-Step Frank Wolfe Projected Gradient Framework
Require: The constants L max{L, L 12 , g max }, N 8L 22 /λ − 1, K, T , , η, λ, θ 0 ∈ Θ, and α 0 ∈ A 1: for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T do
2:
Set α 0 (t) = α t 3:
end for 6:
Compute θ t+1 using first-order information (Frank-Wolfe or projected gradient descent). 
As shown in Step 7 of the algorithm, we can either use projected gradient descent with the update rule
or Frank-Wolfe method with update rule
for updating θ. We show convergence of the algorithm to ε-FNE in Theorems 18 and 19. Let us first show that for sufficiently large K, the inner loop in Algorithm 2 computes a "good" approximation of the solution to the inner problem. This approximate solution will then be used to approximate the gradient of the function g λ (θ) used in the outer loop.
Lemma 17. Define κ = L 22 λ ≥ 1 and assume g λ (θ t ) − f λ (θ t , α 0 (θ t )) < ∆, then for any prescribed ε ∈ (0, 1) if we choose K large enough such that
whereL max{L 12 , L 22 , L, g max , 1} andR = max{R, 1}, then the error e t ∇ θ f λ (θ t , α K (θ t )) − ∇g λ (θ) has a norm e t ≤ δ Lε 2 2 6 R(g max + LR) 2 (20) and
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix B.3.
The above lemma implies that
We are now ready to show the main theorem that implies convergence of our proposed algorithm to an ε-first-order stationary solution of problem (2) . In particular, we show that using ∇ θ f λ (θ t , α K (θ t )) instead of ∇g λ (θ t ) for a small enough λ in the Frank-Wolfe algorithm applied to g λ , leads to an ε-first-order stationary solution.
, and ∆ g g λ (θ 0 ) − g * λ where g * λ min θ∈Θ g λ (θ) is the optimal value of g λ . Moreover, assume that Step 7 in Algorithm 2 sets
and that g λ (θ t ) − f λ (θ, α 0 (θ t )) ≤ ∆ for all iterations in Algorithm 2. Under Assumptions 14 and 3, if we apply Algorithm 2 with
then there exists t ∈ {0, . . . , T } such that (θ t , α t+1 ) is an ε-first-order stationary point of problem (2).
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix B.4.
The next theorem shows a similar result when projected gradient descent is used to update θ in Step 7 of the algorithm.
Theorem 19 (Projected Gradient Descent). Given a prescribed ε ∈ (0, 1). Define
is the optimal value of g λ . Moreover, assume that Step 7 in Algorithm 2 sets
and that g λ (θ t ) − f λ (θ, α 0 (θ t )) ≤ ∆ for all iterations in Algorithm 2. Under Assumptions 3 and 14, if we apply Algorithm 2 with
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix B.5. 
A Proofs for results in Section 3
Before proceeding to the proofs of the main results, we need some intermediate lemmas and preliminary definitions.
Definition 21. [1] A function h(x) is said to satisfy the Quadratic Growth (QG) condition with constant
where h * is the minimum value of the function, and dist(x) is the distance of the point x to the optimal solution set.
The following lemma shows that PL implies QG [22] .
Lemma 22 (Corollary of Theorem 2 in [22] ). If function f is PL with constant µ, then f satisfies the quadratic growth condition with constant γ = 4µ.
The next Lemma shows the stability of arg max α f (θ, α) with respect to θ under PL condition.
Lemma 23. Assume that {h θ (α) = −f (θ, α) | θ} is a class of µ-PL functions in α. Define A(θ) = arg max α f (θ, α) and assume A(θ) is closed. Then for any θ 1 , θ 2 and α 1 ∈ A(θ 1 ), there exists an α 2 ∈ A(θ 2 ) such that
Proof. Based on the Lipchitzness of the gradients, we have that
Then using the PL condition, we know that
Now we use the result of Lemma 22 to show that there exists α 2 = arg min α∈A(θ 2 ) α − α 1 2 ∈ A(θ 2 ) such that
re-arranging the terms, we get the desired result that
Finally, the following lemma would be useful in the proof of Theorem 10.
Lemma 24 (See Theorem 5 in [22] ). Assume h(x) is µ-PL and L-smooth. Then, by applying gradient descent with step-size 1/L from point x 0 for K iterations we get an x K such that
where h * = min x h(x).
We are now ready to prove the results in Section 3.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Let α * ∈ arg max α∈A f (θ, α). By Lemma 23, for any scalar τ and direction d, there exists α
Using Taylor expansion, we get
Thus, by definition of the directional derivative of g, we obtain
Note that this relationship holds for any d. Thus, ∇g(θ) = ∇ θ f (θ, α * ) for any α * ∈ arg max α∈A f (θ, α) = A(θ). Interestingly, the directional derivative does not depend on the choice of α * . This means that ∇ θ f (θ, α 1 ) = ∇ θ f (θ, α 2 ) for any α 1 and α 2 in arg max α∈A f (θ, α).
We finally show that function g is Lipschitz smooth. Let α * 1 ∈ A(θ 1 ) and
where the last inequality holds by Lemma 23.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. First of all, Lemma 24 implies that
Thus, using the QG result of Lemma 22, we know that there exists an α * ∈ A(θ t ) such that
Thus,
where the last inequality holds by our choice of K which yields
Here the second inequality holds sinceR ≥ 1, and the third inequality holds since g max ≤L.
To prove the second part, note that
Here the second inequality holds since ε < 1,L,R ≥ 1, and L ≤L.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 10
Proof. Based on the projection property, we know that
Therefore, by setting θ = θ t , we get
which implies
where α * (θ t ) ∈ arg max α∈A f (θ t , α) and e t ∇ θ f θ t , α t+1 − ∇ θ f θ t , α * (θ t ) . By Taylor expansion, we have
where the last inequality holds by (31) . Moreover, by the projection property, we know that
Here the second inequality holds by Cauchy-Schwartz, the definition of e t and our assumption that Θ ⊆ B R . Moreover, the last inequality holds by our choice of K and Lemma 9 which yields
Hence,
Combined with (32), we get
where the inequality holds by using Cauchy Schwartz and our assumption that Θ is in a ball of radius R. Hence,
where the last inequality holds by combining Lemma 9 and our choice of K and T . Therefore, using Lemma 9, there exists at least one index t for which
This completes the proof of the theorem.
B Proofs in Section 4 B.1 Proof of Lemma 15
Proof. First notice that the differentiability of the function g λ (·) follows directly from Danskin's Theorem [3] . It remains to show that g λ is a Lipschitz smooth function. Let
Then by strong convexity of −f λ (θ, ·), we have
Adding the two inequalities, we get
Moreover, due to optimality of α * 1 , we have
Combining (39) and (40) we obtain
where the last inequality holds by Cauchy-Schwartz and the Lipschtizness assumption. We finally show that g λ is Lipschitz smooth.
where the last inequality holds by (41).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 16
Proof. According to [2, Theorem 4.4], we have
where the second inequality holds by the strong convexity of h and the optimality condition of x * , and the last inequality holds by or choice of N . This yields,
which completes our proof.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 17
Proof. Starting from Lemma 16, we have that
Let α * (θ t ) arg max α∈A f λ (θ t , α). Then by strong convexity of −f (θ t , ·), we get
Combined with the Lipschitz smoothness property of the objective, we obtain
where the second inequality uses (45), and the third inequality uses the choice of K in (19) which yields
Here the second inequality holds sinceR ≥ 1, and the third inequality holds since g max ≤L. To prove the second argument of the lemma, we also use the Lipschitz smoothness property of the objective to get
where the second inequality holds by our Lipschitzness assumption and the last inequality holds by our assumption that L 22 /λ ≥ 1. Moreover,
where the last equality holds since α * (θ t ) is optimal and α * (θ t ) − α K (θ t ) ≤ 1. Combining (47) and (48), we get
Hence, using (15), we get
where the second inequality uses (45), and the last inequality holds by our choice of K in (19) and since ε ∈ (0, 1).
B.4 Proof of Theorem 18
Proof. Using descent lemma on g λ and the definition of L in Algorithm 2, we have
where s t and X t are defined in equations (17) and (18) of the manuscript, and the second and last inequalities use the fact that s t ≤ 1.
Summing up these inequalities for all values of t leads to
where the first inequality holds since X t = ∇ θ f λ θ t , α K (θ t ) − ∇ θ f λ θ t , α * (θ t ) + ∇ θ f λ θ t , α * (θ t ) , s t ≤ g max + e t ≤ 2g max .
Here the first inequality holds by (15) , Cauchy-Schwartz, and the fact that s t ≤ 1. The last inequality holds since by Lemma 17 which yields e t ≤ 1 ≤ g max . Therefore, using Lemma 17, there exists at least one index t for which
Hence, Y(θ t , α K (θ t )) = max s ∇ α f (θ t , α K (θ t )), s s.t. α K (θ t ) + s ∈ A, s ≤ 1 = max s ∇ α f λ (θ t , α K (θ t )), s + λ(α K (θ t ) −ᾱ) T s s.t. α K (θ t ) + s ∈ A, s ≤ 1
where the first inequality uses Cauchy Shwartz and the fact that s ≤ 1, and the last inequality holds due to (52), the choice of λ in the theorem and our assumption that α K (θ t ) −ᾱ ≤ 2R.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 19
which implies ∇ θ f θ t , α * (θ t ) , θ t+1 − θ t ≤ −L θ t − θ t+1 2 + ∇ θ f θ t , α * (θ t ) − ∇ θ f θ t , α t+1 , θ t+1 − θ t = −L θ t − θ t+1 2 + e t , θ t − θ t+1
where α * (θ t ) arg max α∈A f λ (θ t , α) and e t ∇ θ f θ t , α t+1 − ∇ θ f θ t , α * (θ t ) . By Taylor expansion, we have
Moreover, by the projection property, we know that ∇ θ f (θ t , α t+1 ), θ − θ t+1 ≥ L θ t − θ t+1 , θ − θ t+1 , which implies ∇ θ f (θ t , α t+1 ), θ − θ t ≥ ∇ θ f (θ t , α t+1 ), θ t+1 − θ t + L θ t − θ t+1 , θ − θ t+1 ≥ −(g max + 2LR + e t ) θ t+1 − θ t ≥ −2(g max + LR) θ t+1 − θ t .
Hence, −X t ≥ −2(g max + LR) θ t+1 − θ t , or equivalently
Combined with (55), we get
where the last inequality holds by combining Lemma 17 and our choice of K and T . Therefore, using Lemma 17, there exists at least one index t for which
where the first inequality uses Cauchy Shwartz and the fact that s ≤ 1, and the last inequality holds due to (61), the choice of λ in the theorem and our assumption that α K (θ t ) −ᾱ ≤ 2R.
